We Are not a Church of Laws

One of the more troubling developments in the Reformed Church is not conflict or tension (after all, the people of God are the people who strive with God and humans until the sun (Son?) dawns anew), but rather the excessive focus on the church order as a way forward for the church. Perhaps this sounds strange from a church polity teacher and researcher, but church order works best when it is in the background and not in the foreground. When church polity is in the foreground of an assembly or its deliberations, something is profoundly wrong. 

This can be seen with the continual push to put a definition of marriage in the church order, in the push to change the church order in response to a particular situation. We do very little theological reflection on the church, our amendments to the church order are simply legislative. 

The church order exists to facilitate the mission of the church. It exists to give churches a skeleton, a framing, or as A.A. van Ruler speaks of it, the rafters in the cathedral of love. The church order exists to help assemblies to do the work that is given to them, and all of which is to help local churches to bear witness to Christ in their communities as they gather around Word and sacrament, around pulpit, table, and font. Just as in a functional house, the owners rarely notice the framing, in a functional church, the church order should act in a similar way. It provides structure, form, stability, some bounds. Just as when a home is not functional, when things are falling apart, when there are problems, then attention is drawn to the framing; so also when the church is not functional, attention is drawn to the church order. 

In a time such as this, we don’t agree, we have no way of facilitating any kind of meaningful communication after the Reformed Church pulled the plug on the church’s publication (there’s still a denominational publication, which is different than a church publication), and just like the political system, we largely remain in our echo-chambers, distance from others, and seek to craft laws that ensure that “they” conform with “us.”

It is sometimes said that the United States is a nation of laws. That is, the law is supposed to be the thing that rules in the nation-state. But church order is not the ruler of the church, and it is not church law that holds us together. It certainly helps provide structure, but a body is more than a skeleton and a house is more than framing.

We are not a church of laws, the church order does not hold us together. The Spirit holds us together, which may sound like a platitude, but it is not, it is a profound theological reality that is too often taken for granted and not acknowledged. 

***

Too much time is spent at the synodical levels trying to legislate a unified church. This is a futile endeavor which largely ignores the presence and work of the Spirit. When we try to make the church order into something that can hold us together, we will be frustrated at every point. Because it is not intended to do that. The law may be the foundation of the United States, but the Spirit, through Word and sacrament, is the foundation of the church.

And as such, we ought not flee from conflict, tension, and disagreement, but lean into it. This is why we need to be the people who wrestle with God and with one another. And we may be tired, Jacob was, too. But he wrestled all through the night until the dawn of a new day and he squeezed a blessing out of the angel. Wrestling and struggling may not be comfortable, but it is that to which we are called. 

And treating the church order as some sort of fix will not solve anything. It may use power and coercion to reduce conflict or tension, but power and coercion are not traits of the people of God, and it will do nothing for the cause of Christ. 

The law may be the foundation of the United States, but the Spirit, through Word and sacrament, is the foundation of the church. We are not a church of laws. Order is essential to a church, but an order is not what holds us together. We are a church of the Spirit, and we are dangerously close to forgetting that. 

The Value of the Study of Church Polity

It is no surprise that I like church polity*. But my appreciation for church polity is not in the rules, as if I am some kind of stringent rule-follower. In fact, I’m more likely to push boundaries, and I have a tendency to push back against authority. 

For me, church polity isn’t about the rules; church polity is about the theology that lies beneath the rules. 

This is what, so often, gets missed. This is why church polity has been increasingly pushed to the periphery in theological education and in the practice of ministry. Too often, church polity is either ignored or it is used as a means to an end other than the end for which it is intended. The end for which it is intended is to provide a basic structure, consistent with our theology, to free the church to do ministry. How can a book of order free the church? Churches do not have to go to the drawing board for everything.  It is by being freed from having to dwell on the practicalities of these questions that the church can be freed to do the important work of ministry.

But too often, the order is either ignored as largely meaningless for the church of today, or, and even worse, it is used as a means to an end. One can approach the order with an end goal and either seek to find a way to make it possible for it to happen or to change the order to allow it to happen. These approaches are quite different, but they share one commonality–they view the order as something atheological.

But church polity is entirely theological. Indeed, church polity is where ecclesiology, sacramental theology, historical theology meet the life of the church on the ground. 

Church polity is where theology and the practical life of the church meet. And it is for this reason why we would do well to spend more time studying church polity. 

***

Church polity is a window to ecclesiology

In the study of church polity, one can see the shape of the church, the governance, the structure, the functioning of the church. The particular rules and regulations of a church order are not simply matters of practicality and utility (though to be honest, these do play a part), but they also express the particular ecclesiology of a tradition. Governance by offices in assembly, in the Reformed tradition, is certainly not a matter of practicality or efficiency. To be sure, there is a practicality which is required for church polity, after all, it is designed to help the church as it lives its life. But it is always theology which frames a particular polity, which undergirds it and directs it.

While not the only way, this is certainly one valuable way to frame an understanding of ecclesiology, a point of departure to plumb the theological depths. The study of church polity is particularly valuable because it serves as a bridge between the academy and the church, between the theoretical and the practical, between the mind and the feet.

Church polity is a window to sacramental theology

In addition to ecclesiology, the study of church polity can be a window into sacramental theology, particularly how sacramental theology finds its lived expression in the local church. 

Even in the practice of the celebration of the sacraments, one can see theological elements. For instance, why ought the sacraments be performed at a place and time of public worship? Why is the private celebration of the sacraments not acceptable as a normative practice? Why do the elders oversee the celebration of the sacraments? Exploring sacramental theology through the window of church polity aids in understanding how we live our sacramental theology. 

Church polity is a window to historical theology

A church order is a living entity, changing to respond to a changing world. A church order, the particular fruit of a particular church communion’s understanding of its polity, necessarily must change. If it does not change, there is no way that a church is able to adapt to the changing cultural contexts. That it must change is nearly universally accepted. The pace and scope of change is often the points for discussion and dialogue. 

Understanding the reasons for the changes in a church order can give insight not only into the changes in the surrounding culture in which a church communion finds itself, but also changes in the understanding of one’s own church tradition. 

Church polity is a window to ecumenical engagement

An essential aspect of ecumenical engagement is mutual understanding of one another’s traditions. There are different ways to do this, but one important way is to seek to understand how they view the church and how they understand the shape of the church by understanding the differences and similarities between church orders and church polities. By understanding these differences, these can be a point of departure for a deeper understanding of one another’s traditions. And with this understanding can come deeper relationship and collaborative work. 

Church polity is practical theology

One of the challenges that the church faces is the growth of the distance between theology and practice, between the academy and the church. Church polity is a place where, when explored in its fullness, these two can come together, where our practice can be given theological depth of understanding and where our theology can find legs in the ordinary life of the church. Too often the study of church polity is relegated to simply learning the rules and regulations of one’s own church’s particular order. When we understand church polity more fully, as a theological discipline, we can not only learn the rules, but also learn why these rules exist and not others, what function they have, and, broadly, help to learn the logic of the order.

And even beyond a particular church order, a deeper and fuller understanding and approach of church polity as a theological discipline can, at the same time, enhance one’s theological reflection and one’s practice of ministry. 

A deeper study of church polity holds great opportunity, not only for understanding one’s own church order (though this is very much needed), but to understand church polity as a theological discipline and a place where theology and the life of the church meet.


*I use “church polity” to refer to the theological discipline dealing with how a church structures itself, and the term “church order” to refer to a particular form of structuring. 

Descriptivism, Prescriptivism and the Church Order

In lingusitics, there is an ever-present tension between prescriptivism and descriptivism. Briefly (but not comprehensively), prescriptivism holds that grammar rules and usage should be prescribed, that is, there is a more or less stable and normative set of rules. According to prescriptivists, language is stable. Descriptivism allows for change and adaptation. Dictionaries, grammar, and usage are not a single monolith but ought to be adapted to reflect the way that language is used. The former sees a dictionary, for instance, to prescribe the words used in a language, and the latter sees it as something to describe the words used in a language. Prescriptivists insist that “irregardless” is not a word; whereas descriptivists accept it as a word because it is widely used.

I simply bring up this tension–descriptivism and prescriptivism–because it is not only something in linguistics, but it also occurs in the field of church polity, though we often do not use these terms.

Does a church order prescribe how a church ought to live its life, or does it describe how a church does live its life? Is a church order a stable monolith, or is it something which ought to be easily changeable to reflect how things are lived out in the church?

This is certainly not a new debate, and I am not the first to write about it. Indeed, Daniel Meeter describes a similar tension when he makes the excellent, and as yet tragically unheeded, proposal to separate the church order into Constitution and Canons (though I might say “regulations” instead of “canons”). Constitution would be those things which are essential to the church’s being, and canons would be those things which are helpful to live out that essential being as described in the constitution*. Indeed, this is, largely, drawn from the church order of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands that has a church order (constitution) of some thirteen pages but a much longer section of regulations which are nonessential which help the church to live out its essential nature as expressed in the church order proper.

The foundation that the church is governed by offices is very different from, as Meeter notes, the fact that a candidate must be under care for twenty-four months before a Certificate of Fitness for Ministry may be granted (BCO, 1.II.11.3). The former is an essential (of the essence) aspect of how we understand the church, while the latter is a regulation that the church has found to be helpful but could amend with little consequence. Whether it is twenty-seven months or twenty months is neither here nor there.

Moreover, the question of whether the church order ought to prescribe or describe is not easily answered, nor has it only been treated in one manner throughout history.

A via media

As with most other things, the Reformed find a via media–a middle way–between these two extremes. And this is further complicated by the fact that, as noted above, the church order contains points of vastly different importance. Thus, some things in the order are prescriptive and some are descriptive. Some impact the essential nature of the church and some are largely inconsequential. The difficulty, of course, is discerning which regulations are which.

Indeed, the fact that there is a provision for amendments shows that it is not entirely prescriptive. But the fact that it is a constitution, that is, it lays out what constitutes the church and that constitutional changes require two general synods and a supermajority of classes shows that a church order is not entirely descriptive, either.

The difficult work, and the work so rarely engaged, is to discern what in the order is prescriptive and what is descriptive, or to put it in Meeter’s framework, what is constitution, and what is canon?

This work ought to be the foundation of any attempt to amend the church order, not because it should not be amended, but because we must understand the ramifications of what we are doing. The Reformed have always understood that all of the offices are required, and therefore all of the offices must be present for the fullness of Christ’s ministry to be represented (BCO, Preamble, p. 3).

A Case Study

The Reformed Church in America dates its beginning to 1628. This, however, is not the date when Reformed ministry began here, it began earlier than that. This is the date of the arrival of the first minister, Jonas Michaëlius. However, it is not a minister that constitutes a church, but once a minister arrived, a consistory was completed. There were already elders and deacons here, but no minister. But the arrival of a minister completed the consistory, the fullness of Christ’s ministry was now represented to the people, and a church could be organized.

With the recent changes to the commissioned pastor designation, both attempted and accomplished, about which I’ve written previously (here and here), we have redefined how we understand a church.  Previously, where there was no installed minister in a church, a minister of the classis acted as supervisor and was, among other things, present at consistory meetings to complete a consistory, to ensure that all the offices are present. However, in 2014/2015 a change was effected which would allow a commissioned pastor (an elder) to serve as supervisor of a consistory. And thus we have instances where a church is missing one of the offices of the church, and where, as we affirm, the fullness of Christ’s ministry is not present.

What was done in 2014/2015 was to change how we understand a church. Now, this is a perfectly fine thing to do. It is possible for us to change how we understand what constitutes a church. But this was not the discussion that happened. This was a prime instance of not doing the work to determine what is constitution and what is canon, what is more prescriptive and what is more descriptive.

Ongoing struggles over accomplishing an end

Currently, the Reformed Church is in the midst of ongoing struggles on many levels, and one of those levels is how we understand the existence of the church. One faction within the communion desires an end, lockstep uniformity on understandings of human sexuality, despite the fact that many of them have a wide diversity on matters of the covenant and the effectual call of grace.

However, the order that exists in the Reformed Church, and the order how it has existed since the Reformation, resists such a move. However, rather than understanding that perhaps there is some prescriptive piece in the order that teaches us something about the nature of the church, the church order is simply seen as a code of laws that ought to simply allow to be done what the “majority” wants to accomplish. As the South African church polity scholar, Pieter Coertzen, notes, “just as bad as making the church order an authority equal to that of the Scriptures is treating it as something imposed by certain members onto others, or as something that one can find loopholes in with a certain amount of ingenuity.”

And because there is no distinction present in the order which shows a difference between those things which are prescriptive and those that are descriptive, it leaves it up to popular opinion to determine which is which, and often a popular opinion which is driven to see a particular end rather than trying to find a right means.

This is the reason why the General Synod of 2017 made an illegal pronouncement when it tried to declare, in a way almost suggesting doctrines of ex-cathedra infallibility, a definitive interpretation of the Heidelberg Catechism. It was assumed that the General Synod’s inability to make definitive doctrinal declarations on its own was a weakness because the assumption prevailed that the end was righteous and so any means that prevents the end is wicked. Additionally, there has been an increasing number of classes, and there are rumors of more in order to gain a political advantage for the particular faction so as to be able to control the classical approval process of constitutional amendments. When a church order is wholly descriptive, then any and all measures are justifiable.

A church order is not theologically neutral

Indeed, just because we want something to be so doesn’t make it right, and it doesn’t mean that it ought to be done. A church order is not simply a code of laws, but it forms part of the constitution–that which constitutes the church. 

In that the church is a theological entity and not simply a sociological one, in that the church is a creatura verbi, we cannot simply believe that tinkering with her constitution is an exercise in theological neutrality. Indeed, if we do not do the work of determining what is essence and what is regulation, we risk altering the very foundations of how we believe God desires the church to be. In such a case, everyone loses–especially the witness of Christ in the world. 

 

 

 

 


References:

*Meeter, Daniel J. Meeting Each Other in Doctrine, Liturgy, and Government. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993. (see pp. 178-184).

Kerkorde Van De Protestantse Kerk in Nederland: Inclusief De Ordinanties, Overgangsbepalingen En Generale Regelingen (bijgewerkt Tot Mei 2013). Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 2013.

Coertzen, Pieter. Church and Order: A Reformed Perspective. Leuven: Peeters, 1998, p. 50.

BCO – The Book of Church Order of the Reformed Church in America.

Post-Denominationalism, deinstitutionalization, and the future of the church

Like a vast majority of Protestant communions in the United States (and Canada), my church communion, the Reformed Church in America (RCA), has seen a decline in membership and participation during the past several decades. This trend, then, brings questions about the viability of denominations in general, and one’s own in particular. How long can we continue to lose members and still be in existence? How long can we continue? These are ubiquitous questions in the circles in which I operate. However, I think that we are asking the wrong questions and that “denomination” as we understand it is a result of circumstance rather than essence. Indeed, I argue that denomination and church are related yet clearly distinct. This brief essay will use the RCA as a case study for arguing that denominationalism is neither central to our ministry nor is it essential to our continued existence as an ecclesiastical communion. Indeed, those who proclaim the impending doom of the communion fundamentally misunderstand the nature and essence of the church and our communion.

Superstructure and Infrastructure

The church is established by Christ and entrusted to Christ’s people. The Belgic Confession states that the “church has existed from the beginning of the world and will last until the end…” (Art. 27), and therefore we can neither establish nor destroy the church. We do, however, form structures, influenced by the scriptures, to help the church to operate and to live into its calling in the fullest way possible. Indeed, the church could not have continued to exist without some sort of order. This essential order of the church is the discipline of church polity, and continues to be an essential element to the mission of the church. However, in modern Protestantism, there is another structure which has been placed upon the church–denomination.

But before we can speak of denomination, we must speak of order. Order is a necessary part of the people of God and throughout the scriptures, it is apparent that God brings order out of chaos and invites God’s people into that order. The church, therefore, is inherently structural. Indeed, the Preamble to the RCA’s Book of Church Order states, “The governmental functioning of these offices takes place not apart from, but in harmony with the understanding of the mission of the church and the nature of its ministry.” Therefore, the church has infrastructure which sustains it. In my own tradition, the infrastructure is composed of the offices (deacon, elder, minister of Word and sacrament, and professor of theology) and assemblies (consistory, classis, regional synod, General Synod). These are the elements which support and sustain the church and allow it to function. These are elements which constitute the church and are therefore a part of the RCA’s Constitution. While the presbyterial-synodical system is certainly not the only system of church polity, it is the one that we claim, and therefore it is essential to our being of the church.

Above all of this, then, is a superstructure, and this superstructure is designed to support and aid the infrastructure in sustaining the church. The superstructure can be understood as staff, departments, boards, programs, and strategic goals. We might call this superstructure denomination. This superstructure is important, but it is not essential to the church, it is not a constitutive element of the church and is therefore largely absent from the RCA’s Constitution. By viewing the church in terms of infrastructure, which is the necessary base which supports the church, and superstructure, which supports and maintains (and indeed influences) the infrastructure, we can gain a better perspective on reality and the future of the church.

In order to gain a broader view of this superstructure and how it develops, a brief look to the history of the church is both instructive and enlightening.

Origin and Development of “Denomination”

The term, “denomination” finds its origin as a middle way between claiming to be the church, outside of which there is no other, and a sect, which carries with it negative and exclusivist connotations. Linguistically, denomination simply means to give a name to, or to identify by a name. The term and concept of denomination is a result of a religious plurality rather than a singular unity. As such, denomination is a sociological term, rather than a theological one.

Indeed, when the Reformed Church in America adopted its Constitution after independence from the Classis of Amsterdam, it also adopted the “Explanatory Articles” which help to translate the received Reformed theology and order to the particular situation in the newly independent United States. The term “denomination” only occurs in a handful of places, primarily in the Preface. The first occurrence actually defines the term as “descriptions of particular Churches…” and subsequent occurences use it in a consistent way, as such, it is simply a neutral way to refer to different traditions, or expressions, within the Christian Church universal. It is worth noting that the use of this term is a catch all for other churches, not our own.

While a comprehensive history of the usage of the term is not within the scope of this brief essay, it did not take long for the usage of “denomination” to begin the shift from a term primarily speaking of other “particular Churches” to our own church. The church order of 1833 (in which the Articles of Dort and the Explanatory Articles were first merged into a single order), the term occurs four times and nearly always refers to others, rather than ourselves. While much has happened between 1833 and today, by way of comparison, the 2015 edition of the Book of Church Order uses this term approximately seventy-five times, referring not only to other churches but also ourselves, speaking of “the denomination” and “denominational policy.” While the number of occurrences alone is not enough to draw conclusions, it is illustrative of the usage of the term “denomination.” This term, then, has moved even beyond its sociological origins and has become a term to speak of an organizational reality (nearly supplanting theological language), and it is this usage of the term which is most salient for our discussion here.

Increasing Institutionalization

With the continued growth of the RCA, a larger membership and more resources meant that there were both additional opportunities and additional obligations. While the RCA has always been institutional, in the late nineteenth century and onward one can observe a growth in the institutional existence and operation of and in the church.

Growth of organizational superstructure

In 1874 a further major revision of the church was undertaken, which was built on the previous church order (and subsequent amendments) and continued the work of adapting to the ever-changing context in which the RCA found itself. It was in this revision that another provision entered the government (and therefore the Constitution),

To the General Synod also belong the power and duty to institute and organize such general agencies as shall best enable the church to fulfil the command of the Lord Jesus Christ by which He has enjoined on all His disciples the duty of teaching all nations and preaching the gospel to every creature; to maintain, supervise and direct such agencies when erected in the conduct of missionary operations at home and abroad; and to recommend such methods in the churches as shall effectively sustain such agencies and tend to secure the largest possible dissemination of the gospel. (Art. 73)

Here we can see the beginnings of the superstructure that has come to be called denomination which continues to this day. In the generations since, the RCA has added staff, agencies, boards, and councils. The Stated Clerk of the General Synod has become a General Secretary and among the responsibilities was added, “articulating a vision for the church…” However, the denominational (organizational) structure that we now have really only dates back to the middle of the twentieth century.

For most of the history of the Reformed Church, the assemblies were the main agents within the church (in their respective spheres). For those things that were larger than individual churches, classes, or particular (regional) synods (such as foreign mission or theological education), the General Synod established a number of subsidiary boards which aided the church in its mission and ministry. Around mid-point of the twentieth century, there was a movement to provide for a more centralized structure to coordinate the programs of the church. The first of these was the creation of the General Synod Executive Committee (GSEC) in 1961. A significant aspect of the charge given to this committee was to carry out the work of the General Synod between sessions of the General Synod. Not long after, the General Synod approved the merger of three boards and a council to create the General Program Council (GPC) in 1967, which was formally organized in 1968, and was designed to work alongside of GSEC. This continued until 1992, when the General Synod voted to merge GSEC and GPC into the General Synod Council (GSC), which continues to this day and is the main agent of the General Synod which provides oversight and direction. Throughout this, we can see an increasing centralization of the superstructure aligning itself far more to a corporate structure than an ecclesiastical structure.

Post-Denominationalism

There is nothing sacrosanct about the superstructure of denomination. It was born as a result of need and changing cultural contexts, and it can be re-shaped in any way needed as a result to changing contexts and situations. Church polity is the infrastructure that supports the church, which in our case is presbyterial-synodical, but which is actually quite distinct from the superstructure of denomination. The denomination as an organizational reality has been so ingrained in our cultural psyche that, in many ways, it can be difficult to imagine a distinction between denomination and church.

Much of the anxiety present in the RCA regarding membership and participation numbers is rooted in the question of how long the denomination (rather than church) can be sustained. There have been assertions that the RCA cannot survive another schism or separation such as we saw in the nineteenth century. But these fears are largely centered around the viability of the denomination (superstructure), not the viability of the church communion. If we are able to separate these two concepts, it will help us as we (and other communions) look to the future to find our place amidst a changing context. As we seek to separate these concepts, perhaps a few corrective measures can be helpful to help right out perspectives and orientation.

Proposals for the RCA

As the church, we need to be concerned not only with what is efficient, but also what is right and proper. As such, the RCA has become far too hierarchical and corporately focused, that we have forgotten about how the communion actually ought to function. Indeed, many of our structures can serve to aid in the mislocation of the essence of the church. As such, I have a few suggestions for the RCA to help the church recover its ministry and mission.

Return the General Secretary to Stated Clerk

The General Secretary exists, primarily, to serve the General Synod. However, often the General Secretary is given near bishop-like authority. This is problematic not only for the functioning of the church, but also for the understanding of the essence of the church. The story of the ancient people of God show us that it is natural for the people to clamor for a king, but that natural impulse is not necessarily faithful. The Reformed have rejected the nature of prelacy, and so unless we wish to reexamine the foundations of our ecclesiology (which we are free to do), we ought to fight against this natural tendency.

But this proposal involves more than simply a change of job title. It would also involve two changes to the role of this position. First, to remove the provision in the Book of Church Order that the General Secretary shall present “a report articulating a vision for the church…” (1.IV.5.3). This provision places an inordinate amount of focus and authority on one person, and enhances the corporate tendencies of the church. The General Synod has staked much of the RCA’s future in strategic plans, but this continues the mislocation of the essence and purpose of church. Second, to remove the last half of that sentence, “…including recommendations for the future…” (ad loc). This will stop the General Secretary from presenting proposals to the General Synod and making this change will serve as a step toward removing such inordinate focus on this one single individual in the life of the General Synod and the RCA.

Dissolve the General Synod Council (GSC)

The tendency to place more authority and power into a hierarchy is not limited only to persons, but also to groups. Assemblies are not hierarchies and the same goes for subsidiary councils. In practice, the GSC is often seen as the locus of authority and it can seem as though the GSC is willing to accept that authority. There is no real check or balance on the GSC. This council has nothing to do with the essential infrastructure of the church, but rather the nonessential of the superstructure. This single council concentrates authority and further reinforces the hierarchical nature of the church.

The GSC could be dissolved and its functions returned to a collection of subsidiary boards. Returning the functions of the General Synod to a collection of subsidiary boards would allow the General Synod to continue to accomplish the things with which it is charged, while avoiding the concentration of power and authority in some imagined and artificially constructed “top.” One of these subsidiary boards could be an executive committee.

No General Synod assembly for fifty years

Synods exist for the good order of the church rather than being of the essence of the church. Christ’s presence in the church is not, in the first place, through the synods but through Word and Spirit as God’s people gather around pulpit, table, and font. The General Synod itself is also not immune to this tendency to concentrate power at a “top.” How easily we forget that our mother church in the Netherlands did not hold a General Synod for nearly two hundred years after the Synod of Dort in 1618/1619. The Reformed Church did not cease to exist, but was able to continue because a General Synod is not of the essence of the church nor does a General Synod mediate Christ to the church.

At times, a radical corrective is warranted and this, I think, is the case here. As such, I suggest that a General Synod not be called for a period of fifty years. While there is nothing special about the number fifty, I do not think that we need a two hundred year hiatus like our mother church; however, it does need to be enough time that the church can adjust and adapt to this major corrective. It can be possible to empower the new executive committee to do the necessary and essential functions required by law for the corporation of the General Synod, while allowing the lesser assemblies to take more responsibility to fulfill their charge in their respective spheres.

While none of these suggestions will be a panacea, these are steps that might help to aid us in the distinction between superstructure and infrastructure and to place the appropriate amount of focus and emphasis on each.

The Future of the Church

The decline of denominationalism and the waning importance of ecclesiastical communions is a reality with which we must deal, and it is not a trend that we can simply ignore or reverse. I do not think that this is necessarily a bad thing. However, neither do I think that the inevitable future is in independent, unconnected, deinstitutional, generically evangelical churches. The church requires an infrastructure, but the infrastructure does not require the sizable superstructure that is so often the hallmark of modern denominations. The Reformed Church had a ministry as a church before there was a denomination, and oversight and accountability have been undertaken without agencies, boards, or executives.

So long as we are concerned with sustaining the denomination (as a superstructure) we will be fighting a losing battle. However, if we focus instead on being church, allowing the superstructure that we call denomination to change (even drastically) to fit the changing cultural context, we will not only survive, but can even thrive. Neither the essence of the church nor its constitutive elements are found in denomination as a superstructure.

The superstructure is not bad, but it is tentative. It does not form the essence of the church, but rather it is formed out of need and can change with those needs. We need not intentionally abolish our institutions or the superstructure that we call denomination, there is much good that they can (and do) provide. With or without the denomination, a solidly Reformed way of existing as the church and finding a way to provide for mutual ministry and accountability in a connected fashion will continue. But this will involve shifting our mindset, and our behavior, from denomination to church; from a corporation to the body of Christ; from a sociological and organizational reality to a theological one.  We ought not strive to dismantle denomination. However, if our superstructure does become unsustainable, burdensome, or if it begins to crumble, we need not sacrifice the church in order to sustain it.

 

 

Reformed Church General Synod 2017: Deacons in Broader Assemblies

This is part of a series of posts about the items and topics before the General Synod 2017

Other posts in this series:
Commissioned Pastors, Part 1: Foundations
Commissioned Pastors, Part 2: Recommendations before General Synod
Overtures on Declarative Authority

***

While human sexuality will be the topic on everyone’s mind (even if it is not the majority of the business before the General Synod), there are many other topics which are of great significance for not only the functioning of the church, but also how for how the church understands itself.  The Report of the Task Force on Diaconal Ministries is one of those such areas which is far less divisive or emotionally charged but is quite significant. This is contained on pages 76-85 of the General Synod Workbook.

Background

Deacons are members of the consistory of the local church and participate in the governance and oversight of the local church. However, this is, currently, the extent of their participation in the government of the church. All of the broader assemblies, classical and synodical, are composed solely of ministers and elders. The reason for this will be discussed below, but there has been a renewal of the movement, as of late, to provide for deacon participation in broader assemblies. If we are striving to renew a focus on mission, then why, the question goes, do we exclude the deacon, which is the office charged with (what is often thought to be) the most missional ministry? (See MGS 2007, pp.88-103).

While the General Synod in 2007 did not approve recommendations to bring deacons into the classical and synodical assemblies, they did request the Commission on Theology “to prepare a study on whether there is a theological basis within a reformed and missional ecclesiology for the inclusion of deacons as full members of classes, regional synods, and the General Synod…”(MGS 2007, pp. 102-103). The Commission brought a paper to the 2011 General Synod (pp. 289-304). In 2015, the General Synod authorized the creation of a task force to bring recommendations to the General Synod regarding diaconal ministries and assemblies (MGS 2015, p. 242). The report in the workbook this year is the work fo this task force.

The Ministry of the Deacon

To begin the discussion, we must consider the unique ministry with which the office of deacon is charged.

The office of deacon is once of servanthood and service representing Christ through the action of the Holy Spirit. In the local church deacons are chosen members of spiritual commitment, exemplary life, compassionate spirit, and sound judgement, who are set apart for a ministry of mercy, service, and outreach. They are to receive the contributions of the congregation and to distribute them under the direction of the consistory. The deacons give particular attention and care to the whole benevolence program of the church. They have charge of all gits contributed for the benefit of the poor and distribute them with discretion. They visit and comfort those in maerial need and perform such other duties as the consistory may assign them. (BCO, 2016, 1.I.1.10). 

Whereas elders are “set apart for a ministry of watchful and responsible care for all matters relating to the welfare and good order of the church” (BCO, 2016, 1.I.1.8), Deacons are charged with a ministry of “mercy, service, and outreach.” One might say that the elders are charged with care over the household of faith, whereas deacons are charged with care for the greater community. This is a bit of an oversimplification, but one can see that when elders, deacons, and ministers serve together, the “fullness of Christ’s ministry” (BCO, 2016, Preamble, p. 3) is present.

The history of diaconal membership on the consistory is interesting, as well. The church order of Dort (1619) mandated the office of deacon, however, the consistory was made up of ministers and elders. The Articles of Dort did allow for deacons to be members of the consistory “where the numbers of Elders is too small” (Art. 38). However, as the church order of 1833 observes, the deacons have always been joined to the consistory “in America, where the congregations were at first very small…” (Art 50). And so the Reformed Church is somewhat unique in the universal practice of membership of deacons on the consistory.

The understanding of the role of the deacon, however, has been somewhat problematic throughout history. In my own experience, deacons were treated as “junior elders.” In the church in which I grew up people would often serve a couple of terms as a deacon and then they could “progress” to elder. This experience is not unique to me but is a common experience. So in practice, deacons are often reduced to “junior elders” as well as the people who collect and count the money. Therefore, the lived understanding of the ministry of the deacon is often tragically shallow.

Equality of the Ministry

A common argument for including deacons in the broader assemblies is that of the equality of the ministry, often called “parity of office.” This principle, in many ways, is an ecclesiastical Rorschach. It is used as a basis for a multitude of things. So, then, let us look at what the Constitution says about this historic and foundational principle.

The Reformed Church in America uses the term “parity” to describe the concept of the equality of ministers. It is not meant that authority can never be exercised by one over another. But in every instance this authority will be delegated by the proper body, and the authority will cease to be exercised when the need for it is no longer demanded. The principle of equality pertains also among churches, among elders, and among deacons. The principle of the equality of the ministry, conceived now in its broadest sense as including the functions of the elder and the deacon, is based upon the fact that the entire ministerial or pastoral office is summed up in Jesus Christ himself in such a way that he is, in a sense, the only one holding that office. Every ministerial function is found preeminently in him. By his Holy Spirit he distributes these functions among those whom he calls to serve in his name. (BCO, 2016, Preamble, pp. 4-5). 

There is, of course, a great deal condensed in this paragraph. The essence of this principle is as old as the Reformed. At least as far back as the Synod of Emden in 1571 this principle was the very first article, “No church shall lord over another church; no minister of the Word over another minister, no elder over another elder, neither any deacon over another…”* The essence of this is the rejection of hierarchy. There are no cathedrals (more important churches) nor are there bishops (more important clerics). The purpose of this principle is to talk about equality in standing, not lack of distinctness in ministry.

This principle does not intend to say that there are no distinctions between the offices, or that there are no particular ministries given to the specific offices. Indeed, there are particular ministries that are given to the minister that are not given to the elder or deacon; particular ministries given to the elder that are not given to the minister or the deacon; particular ministries given to the deacon that are not given to the minister or the elder. Naturally, these are not clear distinctions, there is overlap. The point is not clear difference, but nuance of calling. Because these offices are given different central ministries means that the people that are called to these offices will often have unique gifts which may be different from one another. A gifted minister may not be a very good deacon, and so forth.

And so when we consider the concept of parity or equality, we must understand that this first means equality among offices — all ministers are equal, all elders are equal, all deacons are equal — and among churches. However, we might be able to expand this concept even further and say that one office is not fundamentally more important than another. All of the offices are needed and essential for their various ministries. But even if we stretch the principle of equality this far, there is still no grounding for the argument that all offices are the same.

And so when we think about this, we must consider what the principle of parity or equality is saying as well as what it is not saying. It is saying that the deacon is not less important than the elder. It is not saying that the deacon and the elder are the same.

Classical and Synodical Assemblies and Elder Participation

To understand the appropriateness of deacons in classical and synodical assemblies, we must first understand why elders are part of these assemblies and the reason that these assemblies exist. And herein lies much of the issue about deacons in broader assemblies. Classes and synods are often seen as “higher” or “more important” assemblies, and so it seems unjust that elders participate in these but not deacons. However, nothing could be further from the truth.

Much of this rests on the question of the reason that classical and synodical assemblies exist. As I have written about previously, the church is at its fullest expression in the local church, as the people of God gather around pulpit, table, and font — around Word and sacrament. The local church is the beating heart of the Church. In fact, if we want to create a hierarchy with the most important body at the top, the local church would be at the top. The local church is where ministry happens. It is where the people of God gather, worship, live the faith in the community in which the church has been placed. The deacon currently participates only at this level because this is the core of where the ministry of “mercy, service, and outreach” lies. The local church is where ministry happens.

The broader assemblies, classical and synodical, are not agents of ministry themselves but they oversee and enable ministry. The broader assemblies, both classical and synodical are not strictly church. Therefore, much of this question hinges on the function of these broader assemblies. Are they agents of ministry or do they oversee and enable ministry? Historically they have been understood to oversee and enable ministry. This is why elders and ministers participate in these broader assemblies, because their work is the work of governance and oversight — which is the ministry of the elder. The elder is “set apart for a ministry of watchful and responsible care for all matters relating to the welfare and good order of the church” (BCO, 2016, 1.I.1.8).

Elders, then, participate in these broader assemblies because this is the ministry which is given to this office. Deacons do not participate in the broader assemblies because oversight over the household of faith is not the ministry of the deacon. This in no way implies that a deacon is less important or “lower” than an elder, but that they are different.

We may want to rethink the purpose of the assemblies, and perhaps we are backing into doing so. But if we are going to do this, we must discuss this rather than the piecemeal approach which has been so common as of late.

Including deacons in classical and synodical assemblies in the way proposed by the recommendations before the General Synod, namely that the assemblies consist of ministers and elders or deacons, are simply distorting the unique ministries given to the elder and the deacon. Namely, that the deacon may now be involved in governance, oversight, and discipline instead of their crucial ministry of mercy, service, and outreach, and it is quite possible that this may make the problem of seeing deacons as junior elders even worse. While the goal, I think, is to make the assemblies more missionally-minded, the likely outcome is that deacons will simply be doing the work of elders.

This is not to say that there is no place for deacons in broader bodies, but those ought to be bodies which are specifically geared toward the ministry of the deacon, which leads to an excellent recommendation, to encourage the creation of diaconal assemblies.

Diaconal Assemblies

There certainly is a place for broader collaboration between deacons, and this is where deacons participating in some way in broader assemblies would be proper, helpful, and right. The creation of diaconal assemblies opens a world of possibilities for deacons to collaborate and work together on shared ministries in a way that respects their unique ministries.

The shape of these diaconal assemblies are limited only by the imagination and this avoids the problem of reducing or eliminating the disctinctives of the office of deacon and also goes further to remedy the problem of seeing deacons as junior elders. One might even envision diaconal assemblies parallel to the classes and synods, which are given real and important responsibilities in ministries which relate to mercy, service, and outreach. This is the more difficult path because, in many places, this would involve beginning something that is not yet existent (although nothing at all prevents its creation, and in some places such bodies exist). This is the more difficult path, but it is the best path.

Conclusion

There would certainly be a benefit to the church for deacons participating and collaborating in broader bodies. In addition to diaconal bodies, however, there may be a place for deacons in broader assemblies, but this is not it. Because the Government is constitutional, such a change is not simply an operational change but a change in the foundation of how we understand how the church functions. I do not oppose such changes, quite to the contrary, however, these changes must be carefully thought out and the consequences must be acknowledged. Changes of this magnitude ought not be done hastily or quickly, and these proposed amendments do not offer sufficient rationale or substantive change toward a way of rightly and fully incorporating deacons into the broader life and ministry of the Reformed Church.

Indeed, if we would wish to truly and rightly include deacons in the ministry of the broader church, we might consider thinking bigger than simply making deacons delegates to the broader assemblies. Perhaps we might even rethink how these assemblies work and how they might work in the future to better reflect the ministry of the deacon.


*Coertzen, Pieter. “Dordt and South Africa.” In Protestant Church Polity in Changing Contexts I, edited by Allan J. Janssen and Leo J. Koffeman, 137-53. Zurich: LIT Verlag, 2014, 141.

 

 

Reformed Church General Synod 2017: Overtures on Declarative Authority

This is part of a series of posts about the items and topics before the General Synod 2017

Other posts in this series:
Commissioned Pastors, Part 1: Foundations
Commissioned Pastors, Part 2: Recommendations before General Synod

***

An addition to the General Synod Workbook was recently released containing overtures from the regional synods. There are a few topics worth discussing contained therein, but for this post, we will look at the overtures that mention “declarative authority” — Overtures 34-38.

While I have previously discussed declarative authority and how it, in no way, means what it is purported to mean in these overtures, this is certainly not the only fallacy which these overtures rest upon.

Representative Principle

The use of the representative principle in these overtures is grossly misguided. The representative principle primarily counters congregationalism, where the congregation itself is the authority. It also shows that when a consistory, for instance, makes a decision “within the proper exercise of authority,” (Preamble, p. 3-4), that decision cannot be ignored, rejected, or protested against. There is nothing in the representative principle that justifies such a broad and unlawful usurpation of church power by the General Synod — particularly because the General Synod itself, as such, is not properly church. Synods exist for the good order of the church, they are not part of the essence of the church. 

Nature of the 1979 Judicial Case

Indeed, the reasons listed in support of these overtures are substantial, and substantially incorrect.

In large part the overture is founded upon a number of combined judicial cases in 1979. These cases were initiated as judicial actions (complaints against classes that ordained women). Because the cases were initiated by means of the judicial process the General Synod had to accept it as such. It is therefore factually false to claim that the “General Synod decided that the matter could be treated as judicial business.”

The factual error is important, because they lead to the fundamental problem with the overtures: they fundamentally misunderstand the unique nature of judicial business by confusing the nature of an assembly with the nature of a judicatory.

Judicial cases function very differently than assemblies, and the scope of their decisions is therefore markedly different. “Higher” and “lower” are terms that can only be used of judicatories. The judicial ruling of a higher judicatory (regional or general synod) must be carried out by the lower judicatory from which the case originated.

The same is not the case for assemblies. Assemblies make decisions and enact policies that affect their own lives together without infringing on the responsibilities of the other assemblies. 

The 1979 action had consequences for the whole church because it was a judicial case that affected the life of the whole church. The General Synod, acting as an assembly, had previously stated (exercising proper declarative authority) that “Scripture nowhere excludes women from eligibility to the offices but always emphasizes their inclusion, prominence, and equal status with men in the Church of Jesus Christ” (MGS 1958, p. 328), but the matter of whether any narrower assembly would actually ordain a woman was left to the narrower assemblies (consistories and classes). If the General Synod’s 1958 decision had carried the church-wide authority of a judicial matter, the 1979 case never would have happened. The synodical statement of 1958 was relevant in 1979, not because it had a “declarative authority” for the entire Reformed Church, but because it looked to its own past for guidance in making its decision.

Thus, since 1979, the matter of the ordination of women has been settled de jure (in law) for the RCA. Objectors could object, but could not bring an action against the ordination of a woman, so long as the ‘conscience clause’ was in effect.

Even so, to say that the place of women in the offices of the church is settled de facto (in the way we actually conduct our life together) is simply not accurate. Women continue to struggle for their calls to be validated through large swaths of the Reformed Church. There are still churches that will not allow women to serve in church offices (and in some cases they are theoretically eligible but not in practice), and women still find the validity of their office and call challenged. If, as the overtures allege, the General Synod made such a sweeping declarative statement in the past, why does not everyone fall in line?

If even the judicial action of 1979 (which is fundamentally different from what is proposed now) could not secure uniformity, how is an action that is based on a falsehood supposed to help the church on the way toward the desired uniformity? 

The “argument from 1979” does not provide any basis whatsoever for the General Synod, as an assembly, to make declarative statements in the manner proposed in these overtures.

Constitution, the Heidelberg Catechism, and Binding Interpretations

At the bottom of pages 3 and 6, the reasons reference a report from the Commission on Church Order from 2014, yet the use of that report was misleading. 

First, a broader look at the context of that quote itself.

 

only those things that are included in our Constitution may be treated as binding upon the ministers and congregations of the RCA. The way in which something is included in the Constitution is fairly straightforward: decision by the General Synod, and then approval by at least two-thirds of the classes, after which that approval is finalized by the subsequent General Synod. That aspect of our polity has implications for the authority of what a General Synod might say… (MGS 2014, p. 241).

 

Thus, only a sentence later it goes on to say that this has “implications for the authority of what a General Synod might say…” They go on to quote a section from a 2013 paper,

Statements, pronouncements, and policies of the General Synod or its agencies are not part of the Constitution. Nor are position papers and policy documents of the denomination. Surely these all have some authority, and our practice shows that they have varying kinds of authority. Insofar as they educate and exhort, they have an influence upon the church which can be seen as authoritative. As they direct denominational staff and agencies to act in certain ways, they are binding on those persons and agencies. Yet whatever authority they have is not constitutional authority. These do not bind or control the church, its members, congregations, or officers in the same way as do things that are part of the Constitution. In short, they are not constitutional. (MGS 2013, p. 357)

No one disputes the fact that the Heidelberg Catechism is completely constitutional, but what the General Synod cannot do is to make a definitive interpretation of the Constitution and treat such an unconstitutional decree as constitutional. There is nothing anywhere in the Constitution or in our history which would give the General Synod this authority, indeed, the General Synod cannot even give itself this authority.

The 2014 paper continues,

What, then, can be said about the authority of the General Synod within the church? Cautioned by the conundrum identified at the beginning of this statement, the commission wishes to point to some principles that are named in the church order. Christ governs his church through the offices (BCO Preamble, pp. 2–3). Each assembly of the church is a gathering of the offices and as such receives its authority from Christ (BCO Preamble, p. 4). In a fundamental sense of authority, then, the General Synod does not receive Christ’s delegated authority more than the other assemblies do, nor, indeed, less than the other assemblies do. One of the earliest principles of Reformed church order is the one by which responsibilities among the assemblies of the church are arranged such that ‘the greater assemblies care for the ministry that extends beyond the purview of the lesser assemblies without infringing upon the responsibilities of the lesser’ (BCO Preamble, p. 3).

At the same time, as noted above, the voice of the General Synod within the church can be powerfully influential. Some might question whether something can have authority and not be binding. We find, however, that authority functions to the extent that authority is accepted (or “acknowledged,” as the 1976 statement put it). The reality is that General Synod statements and resolutions are authoritative in the various senses mentioned above—first because the synod is an assembly of office-bearers, and also because we have covenanted together as office-bearers, churches, and assemblies to accept synod’s statements and resolutions as having authority, the nature, influence, and scope of which clearly vary depending on context, intent, and the passage of time. (MGS 2014, p. 241-242).

 

The Nature of Authority

The deeper issue, however, present in these overtures and in many of the discussions about human sexuality and what the General Synod should or should not do, or can or cannot do is the nature of authority itself. The overtures are correct in noting that the General Synod has the ability to exercise declarative authority. The fact is, the General Synod exercises declarative authority in the ordinary course of its work.

When the General Synod divested from Apartheid South Africa, the General Synod made a declarative statement that Apartheid was not in accordance with Scripture. The General Synod and its corporations, boards, and agencies were required to follow this action, but this action did not require classes or consistories, for instance, from doing the same. Similarly, the General Synod has consistently spoken in favor of increased gun control. This, however, does not force everyone in the Reformed Church to agree with this. Indeed, many in the Reformed Church oppose increased gun control.

Some might say that this lacks authority, however, this is certainly not the case at all. Synodical statements are very authoritative and the assemblies of the churches would do well to take the statements of General Synod seriously. What they don’t have is a single type of authority, that is, the authority to coerce. Simply the act of the General Synod saying something or making a statement does not end discernment of a matter. One cannot say, “The General Synod said it, I have to accept it, that settles it.”

At issue, though, is the extraordinarily reductionist view of authority which seems to be present in these overtures. The above-referenced report also speaks to authority.

In response to the second question—What is the nature of the authority of the General Synod on issues of doctrine and interpretation of Scripture?—it is abundantly clear that statements and resolutions of the General Synod are authoritative. One important question, however, concerns how they are authoritative. That is, what kind of authority do these have?

For authority is not merely a binary state, so that something is either authoritative or completely lacking in authority. There are various kinds of authority. This may be seen in the varied intended meanings when we call someone an “authority.” Are we referring to an expert, or to a police officer? In the former case, the authority has knowledge and competence worth accepting. In the latter, the authority has legal standing to enforce the law. Moreover, continuing with those examples, we readily understand that each of these authorities exercises his or her authority within an appropriate sphere. The expert is authoritative within that one’s field of expertise and not outside it. The police officer’s authority is valid in a given jurisdiction and not outside it.

In looking at the historical record, the commission observes that statements and resolutions of General Synod demonstrate a variety of kinds of authority and a variety of forces of authority as the church has accepted them to various degrees…

We may find a mix of kinds and scope of authority in the case of RCA divestment in companies working in South Africa during the apartheid era. The General Synod decided to divest its assets from such companies. That action applied only to the denomination’s own investments and not to those of congregations or of the RCA colleges. It did not bind consistories or boards of trustees. It was binding only on those who made investment decisions for the General Synod. Yet that action was intended to stand as an authoritative witness to the rest of the church. It had moral authority and perhaps even prophetic authority. The biblical reasoning used to support the decision to divest was marshalled to make a powerful scriptural case for the action taken. In all these respects, the decision of synod was authoritative, even though it was binding, strictly speaking, only upon the General Synod’s own agencies. (MGS 2014, p. 240- 1).

To reduce all authority to a matter of something which is judicially binding or that has the power to coerce is little more than worldly reasoning and does nothing for the benefit or the life of the church.

Conclusion

These overtures are correct in one thing: the charge given to the General Synod is not in administering the denominational program, the primary work of the General Synod is to address and wrestle with theological issues as it fulfills its charge as an assembly of the church, a gathering of office bearers. This is certainly something of which the Reformed Church needs to be reminded as too often the General Synod functions as an administrative body which simply approves whatever the General Synod Council says or does. However, this does not mean that whatever the General Synod does ought to be binding on all the assemblies of the Reformed Church. Certainly the statements of General Synod have authority (even significant authority), but not all authority is coercive and heavy-handed as these overtures advocate. The General Synod ought to aid the assemblies in their work, not do the work for them. This is the point at which these overtures drastically go astray. 

Declarative Authority and the General Synod

The Book of Church Order, in its Preamble, notes three types of authority that Christ has given to the church: ministerial, declarative, and spiritual.

Ministerial authority is the right to act as Christ’s servants. Declarative authority is the right to speak in his name within the limits set by Scripture. The church shall declare what is in the Word and act upon it, and may not properly go beyond this. Spiritual authority is the right to govern the life and activity of the church and to administer its affairs. The church shall not exercise authority over the state, nor should the state usurp the authority of the church. (p. 2-3)

The type of authority at issue, here, is declarative. From time to time, particularly as of late when many in the Reformed Church have lost sight of the doctrine of the church, we try to see a hierarchy where there is none, and we become confused about what is meant by the term, church.

In our tendency to abandon that to which God has called us and to demand a king (1 Sam 8), we periodically look to the General Synod to form a definitive teaching of the church. That is, the argument goes, that because the General Synod is the “top” or the “highest body” they ought to be the body charged with making scriptural and doctrinal interpretations that must be followed.

***

This error was seen at last year’s General Synod when, considering questions of human sexuality, the special task force stated in their report that the question must be answered whether human sexuality is “a cultural, ethical, and personal matter (and thus an issue for local classes and consistories to deal with), or a biblical and theological matter (and thus the purview of General Synod to speak to the whole church)” (MGS 2016, p.80). This distinction presented that “cultural, ethical, and personal” matters are the responsibility of classes and local consistories, while “biblical and theological” matters are the responsibilities of the General Synod is a distinction that was invented in this place at that time, and had absolutely no grounding in our polity, the church order, our understanding of church, or history. In fact, this distinction becomes problematic because it strips consistories and classes of their responsibilities in biblical and theological interpretation and application, it seeks to create a single body (akin to the Roman Catholic Church’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) that has the ability to deal with biblical and theological matters, and it makes a division between the personal and ethical and the biblical and theological.

The General Synod does deal with the biblical and the theological, it is an ecclesiastical assembly, after all. And because it concerns itself only with the interests of the entire communion, it won’t deal with the personal, at least in the ordinary course of its proceedings. However, the biblical and theological are not only reserved for the General Synod, because whenever a local consistory or board of elders or a classis does its work, it also does scriptural interpretation and application and deals with theological matters. The point, however, is that they wrestle with it for their particular area of charge, not the entire communion.

***

Thus, we already have a tendency toward this error, and we have a tendency toward the error of a hierarchy and it is not uncommon to read about declarative authority and assume that this is a special property of the General Synod, after all, how can a local church declare “what is in the Word”? Isn’t this a matter for a higher authority? Should not the General Synod have the ability to make declarations on biblical and theological matters that all must follow?

It is easy to see how one can fall into this spiral, and it makes a certain degree of sense. However, the logic of this line of thinking is not the logic that is consistent with the Reformed understanding of church. This is far closer to a monarchical episcopacy, even if expressed collegially. The difference between episcopacy and Reformed governance is not only that the Reformed gather to govern the church, it is also that Reformed church government does not understand or recognize a higher or lower form of authority.

And thus, to reserve declarative authority solely, or especially, for a synodical assembly establishes a higher and lower form of authority. Indeed, the Explanatory Articles of 1792/3 state,

All Ecclesiastical Assemblies possess a right to judge and determine upon matters within their respective jurisdictions (Art. XXXI). 

Therefore, consistories, boards of elders, and classes exercise declarative authority in an equal way to a synodical assembly, just with a different scope of jurisdiction.

Indeed, in describing the authority of the assemblies, the Church order of Dort (1619) states,

A Classis hath the same jurisdiction over a consistory, which a Particular Synod hath over a Classis, and a General Synod over a Particular (Art. XXXVI).

While there have been some changes, the principle remains the same, the type of authority remains the same between assemblies, and there is no “higher” or “lower” in the typical sense of the terms.

***

But what about the question of the rightness of the General Synod exercising declarative authority to make binding and authoritative scriptural and doctrinal declarations that must be followed by all assemblies and the office bearers who are accountable to them? After all, wouldn’t that be fitting for the General Synod in the exercise of its authority, to make decisions for the entire communion?

Indeed, the Articles of Dort does not envision a General Synod that makes decisions for the entire church. The Explanatory Articles expanded a bit on the General Synod and brought in the concept of “represent[ing] the whole body” (Art. LI). But with this, one must also balance Article XXX of Dort,

A greater Assembly shall take cognizance of those things alone which could not be determined in a lesser, or that appertain to the churches or congregations in general, which compose such an assembly.

This, then, shows that a greater assembly does not have the right to interfere with the lawful workings of a narrower, or lesser, assembly. Indeed, the record shows that the General Synod has always been cautious when making statements so as not to slip into the trap of speaking ex cathedra and going beyond the constitution. Indeed, the General Synod has never been given the authority to “establish the definitive teaching of the church” (MGS 2007, p. 306).

The General Synod does not have among its powers the determination of what, finally, is the ‘teaching of the church.’ In Reformed church order, the teaching of the church is determined by the creeds and confessions of the church” (MGS 2005, p. 91). 

Indeed, the only way that the church communion can make binding declarative statements is through the Constitution, which requires far more agreement than simply a General Synod. The General Synod is not charged with making constitutional changes on its own. Constitutional changes require the concurrence of a supermajority of classes, and thus, it is not the General Synod making declarations, but it is the church communion making declarations. The General Synod, all by itself, making declarations and interpretations that are binding on all the assemblies and office-bearers of the church is a massive usurpation of church power.